Analysis Of A Philosopher’s Views

unselfish, that you give up your happiness to the selfishness of someone else, or that the person demanding it has just never thought it out.

‘W’hatever the reason, you’re not likely to convince such a person to stop his demands. But it will create much less pressure on you if you realize that it’s bis self- ish reason. And you can eliminate the problem entirely by looking for more com- patible companions.

To find constant, profound happiness requires that you be free to seek the grat- ification of your own desires. It means making positive choices.

If you slip into the Unselfishness Trap, you’ll spend a good part of your time making negative choices-trying to avoid the censure of those who tell you not to think of yourself. You won’t have time to be free.

If someone finds happiness by doing “good works” for others, let him. doesn’t mean that’s the best way for you to find happiness.

And when someone accuses you of being selfish, just remember that he’s upset because you aren’t doing what be selfishly wants you to do.

Srunv QursroNs

1,. Browne claims that when we behave unselfishly we, more often than not, sacrifice our own happiness. Do you agree? ‘Why’or why not?

2. Browne says that everyone is selfish because we all do what we believe will make us feel good. Critics of egoism such as James Rachels claim that what makes an act selfish or unselfish is its obiecf, not simply that it makes you feel good. If you are the sort of person who feels good when you help others, then you are unselfish. If you feel good only wben helping yourself, then you are selfish. Discuss the issue that divides Rachels and Browne, and assess their respective positions.

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Egoism and Moral Skepticism

James Rachels

James Rachels (194I-2003) was Universiry Professor of Philosophy a the Universiry of Alabama. He is the author of several books, includin The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality (1.986), Created from Animal: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (1990), and Can Ethics Prouid Answers? And Otber Essays in Moral Philosopby (1997).

EGorsM AND MoRAr sKEprlcrsM From A Neut lntroduction to Philosophy by James Rachels. Edited by Steven M. Cahn (Harper and Row, 1,971,). Copyright @ 1971, by Steven M. Cahn. Reprinted by permission of Steven M. Cahn.

 

 

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good part of your time rose who tell you not to

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ften than not, sacrifice our

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JAMES RAcHELS: EGorsM AND MoRAL sKEprrcrsM 1S9

Psychological egoism is the view that human beings always act from a sin- gle motive: self-love. Ethical egoism is the moral theory that says we ought to act only from self-love. Rachels tries to expose the logical and moral weaknesses of both theories. For example, he challenges the view often proffered by defenders of psychological egoism: ‘S?’e are selfish because we always do what we want to do. One person wAnts to visit and cheer up a lonely elderly neighbor; another wants to rob and terrorize the neighbor. Both do what they want; both are selfish. Rachels points out that what makes an act selfish is its object, not that you want to do it. If the object of most of your actions is to please yourself, then you are selfish; if you often want to please others, you are kind. If you want to harm them, you are malicious. Rachels also argues that both psychological and ethical egoisms rest upon a distorted view of human nature. Most of us are sympathetic and care about the well-being of others. The reason we do not burn down a department store is not because it might not be in our long-range best interest to do so, but because “people might be burned to death.”

I

Our ordinary thinking about morality is full of assumptions that we almost never question. We assume, for example, that we have an obligation to consider the wel- fare of other people when we decide what actions to perform or what rules to obey; we think that we must refrain from acting in ways harmful to others, and that we must respect their rights and interests as well as our own. ‘Sfe also assume that peo- ple are in fact capable of being motivated by such considerations, that is, that peo- ple are not wholly selfish and that they do sometimes act in the interests of others.

Both of these assumptions have come under attack by moral skeptics, as long ago as by Glaucon in Book tr of Plato’s Republic. Glaucon recalls the legend of Gyges, a shepherd who was said to have found a magic ring in a fissure opened by an earthquake. The ring would make its wearer invisible and thus would enable him to go anywhere and do anything undetected. Gyges used the power of the ring to gain entry to the Royal Palace where he seduced the Queen, murdered the King, and subsequently seized the throne. Now Glaucon asks us to determine that there are two such rings, one given to a man of virtue and one given to a rogue. The rogue, of course, will use his ring unscrupulously and do anything necessary to increase his own wealth and power. He will recognize no moral constraints on his conduct, and, since the cloak of invisibility will protect him from discovery, he can do anything he pleases without fear of reprisal. So there will be no end to the mis- chief he will do. But how will the so-called virtuous man behave? Glaucon suggests that he will behave no better than the rogue:

No one, it is commonly believed, would have such iron strength of mind as to stand fast in doing right or keep his hands off other men’s goods, when he could go to the market-place and fearlessly help himself to anything he wanted, enter houses and sleep with any woman he chose, set prisoners free and kill men at his pleasure, and in a word

 

160 MoRALITY AND sELF-INTEREST

go about among men with the powers of a god. He would behave no bener than the other; both would take the same co.r.s..1

Moreover, why shouldn’t he? Once he is freed from the fear of reprisal, why shouldn’t a man simply do what he pleases, or what he thinks is best for himself? \fhat reason is there for him to continue being “moral” when it is clearly not to his own advantage to do so?

These skeptical views suggested by Glaucon have come to be known as psycho- Iogical egoism and ethical egoism respectively. Psychological egoism is the view that all men are selfish in everything that they do, that is, that the only motive from which anyone ever acts is self-interest. On this view, even when men are acting in ways apparently calculated to benefit others, they are actually motivated by the belief that acting in this way is to their own advantage, and if they did not believe this, they would not be doing that action. Ethical egoism is, by contrast, a norma- tive view about how men ought to act. It is the view that, regardless of how men do in fact behave, they have no obligation to do anything except what is in their own interests. According to the ethical egoist, a person is always justified in doing what- ever is in his own interest, regardless of the effect on others

Clearly, if either of these views is correct, then “the moral institution of life” (to use Butler’s well-turned phrase) is very different than what we normally think. The majoriry of mankind is grossly deceived about what is, or ought to be, the case, where morals are concerned.